We have written about the critical behavioural skills underlying high quality strategic thinking in a boardroom. Based on what I read and see, I fear the outcome of the Covid Inquiry will not deliver the strategic resolution we need.

The Inquiry is attracting increasing criticism in the press for its focus on personalities and the culture prevalent at the time rather than examining the real lessons to be learned for management of future pandemics.

Jonathan Sumption KC[1] writes that learning lessons means assessing policy options with the benefit of hindsight and the mass of information now available rather than apportioning blame, as the Inquiry appears to be doing. He raises the absence of any critical analysis of the modelling of the spread and impact of the pathogen and the assumption that people would take no steps for their own protection. He speaks of the complete absence of any attention to international comparisons.

In an article in the Spectator, Professor Carl Heneghan[2] argues that this is an opportunity for the inquiry to gather evidence and ask whether lockdown and other interventions worked. He concludes that the whole inquiry is working on the premise that we should have locked down harder sooner and longer and is avoiding examination of other options.  

If they are right, and if one can rely on the media coverage as a fair representation of the Inquiry’s approach, we are observing a very poor example of strategic thinking. I accept that the Inquiry is not performing a like function to a board of directors. But both use the experience of past events and the outcome of past decisions to design policies or inform future actions. Surely the same critical behavioural traits apply.

Good boards think strategically. They equip themselves with the right information with which they diagnose the opportunities and costs of future actions.

Is this Inquiry seeking and harvesting all relevant information? Is it looking at strategies adopted in other jurisdictions and measuring their success? Rich and broadly based information is the foundation of any high quality strategic analysis. Is this Inquiry sufficiently sensitised to the risks of being too selective or dismissive of information for reasons of bias?

Without all the relevant data the Inquiry will struggle to form a proper diagnosis to help understand what might have been the right response and develop effective solutions for the future.

Based on the reported approach, I am also concerned that this Inquiry is not demonstrating the intellectual agility required to evaluate the strategic options and possibilities weighing up the pros and cons of different options linking different concepts and synthesising alternatives. 

Will it deliver a viable and effective action plan for the future, or will it merely be a castigation of past conduct serving only to tell people how not to behave rather than what they should do? 

If the latter, how has this happened? When you look at the Inquiry’s published terms of reference[3] you will see the detail and focus attached to its Aim 1 being to ‘Examine the COVID-19 response and the impact of the pandemic in England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, and produce a factual narrative account, including ( 36 itemised bullet points) ……’ dwarfs the reference to Aim 2 being simply to ‘Identify the lessons to be learned from the above, to inform preparations for future pandemics across the UK’ seemingly included as a mere afterthought. Little wonder the Inquiry’s attention is misdirected and how critical then it is that terms of reference of any Inquiry of this sort are crafted in such a way as to encourage better strategic thinking.

What would be your board’s approach to commissioning an inquiry?

[1] Jonathan Sumption: Why the Covid inquiry is a farce (thetimes.co.uk)

[2] You searched for Carl heneghan | The Spectator

[3] https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-covid-19-inquiry-terms-of-reference/uk-covid-19-inquiry-terms-of-reference